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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to propose and study properties of multiwinner voting
rules which can be consider as generalisations of single-winner scoring voting rules. We
consider SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, STV, and several variants of Chamberlin–Courant’s
and Monroe’s rules and their approximations. We identify two broad natural classes of
multiwinner score-based rules, and show that many of the existing rules can be captured
by one or both of these approaches. We then formulate a number of desirable properties
of multiwinner rules, and evaluate the rules we consider with respect to these properties.
1 Introduction
There are many situations where societies need to select a small set of entities from a larger
group. For example, in indirect democracies people choose representatives to govern on
their behalf, companies select groups of products to promote to their customers [37,38], web
search engines decide which pages to display for a given query [21], and applicants for a job
(e.g., a tenure-track position at a university) are short-listed prior to conducting interviews.
For all these tasks we need formal rules to perform the selection, and the desirable properties
of such rules may depend on the task at hand. We view these selection rules as multiwinner
voting rules which, given individual preferences, output groups of winners (which we call
committees).
Multi-winner elections are even more ubiquitous than single-winner ones, but much
less studied. They were implicitly considered under the umbrella of choice functions [1,
24] but in this model the size of the elected committee could not be controlled and it
was Debord [19] and Felsenthal and Maoz [23] who introduced several k-choice functions
that elect committees of size exactly k, and investigated their properties. However even
within this narrower framework several quite distinct models happily coexist, which makes
a simultaneous study of them difficult. One obvious classification is based on the type of
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the input. There are preference-based rules (for which inputs are sequences of linear orders;
see, e.g., the work of Brams and Fishburn [10]), approval-based rules (for which inputs are
sequences of dichotomies; see, e.g., the overview of Kilgour [32]), tournament-based rules
(for which inputs are either tournaments or weighted tournaments; see the book of Laslier
for a general overview of tournament-based rules [35]). With a few exceptions, majority of
papers that study (properties of) multiwinner rules are devoted to approval-based rules [2,
11,14,32,33] and to rules based on various forms of the Condrocet principle [22,25,27,41].
On the other hand, our paper focuses on rules that, in some broader sense, can be seen as
extensions of positional scoring rules. Our goal is to review some natural preference-based
multiwinner rules, to present a uniform framework for their study, and to propose a set of
natural properties (axioms) against which these rules can be judged. In effect, we focus on
the model where voters have ordinal preferences.
We have picked ten voting rules as examples of different ideas pertaining to (scoring-
based) multiwinner elections: STV, SNTV, k-Borda, Bloc, three variants of Chamberlin–
Courant’s rule [7,15,37], and three variants of Monroe’s rule [7,39,46]. STV and SNTV are
well-known rules that are used for parliamentary elections in some countries;1 Bloc is a
rule that asks voters to specify their favorite committee of k candidates and selects those
k candidates that were nominated more often than others; k-Borda picks k alternatives
with the highest Borda scores and is representative of rules used for picking k finalists in a
competition (indeed, Formula 1 racing and Eurovision song contest use scoring rules very
similar to Borda). Chamberlin–Courant’s rule and Monroe’s rule are examples of rules
that, like STV, focus on proportional representation, but are based on explicitly assigning
a committee member (a representative) to each voter. We also consider two rules based
on approximation algorithms, for the Chamberlin–Courant’s rule [37] and for the Monroe’s
rule [46]. We consider them as voting rules in their own right. All these rules can be seen
as being loosely based, in some way, on single-winner scoring protocols.
We are interested in judging the selected multiwinner rules with respect to their appli-
cability in the following settings:
Parliamentary Elections. Voting rules for such elections should respect the “one person,
one vote” principle. This is reflected in the requirement that each elected member should
represent, roughly, the same number of voters. Some such rules are based on electoral
districts, i.e., separate (possibly multiwinner) elections are held in different parts of the
country, while others treat the whole country as a single constituency, and focus on
proportional representation of different population groups.
Shortlisting. Consider a situation where a position is filled at a university. Each faculty
member ranks applicants in order to create a short-list of those to be invited for an
interview. One of the important requirements in this case is that if some candidate is
shortlisted when k applicants are selected, then this candidate should also be shortlisted
if the list were extended to k + 1 applicants.
1For example, the upper house of the Parliament of Australia uses a variant of STV; a variant of SNTV
is used, e.g., in Puerto Rico.
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Movie selection. Based on rankings provided by different customer groups, an airline
has to decide which (few) movies to offer on their long-distance flights. It is important
that each passenger finds something satisfying. This task is similar to parliamentary
elections, but without the need to worry that each movie would be watched by the same
number of people. It is, however, quite different from shortlisting: If there are two
similar candidates, then for shortlisting we should, typically, take either both or neither,
whereas in the context of movie selection it makes sense to pick at most one of them.
Skowron et al. [45] expand this view of multiwinner elections and provide a number of
other examples and applications.
We study properties of voting rules that are important in the above-listed settings. We
introduce committee monotonicity, solid coalitions property, consensus committee prop-
erty, and unanimity, and adapt the standard notions of monotonicity, homogeneity, and
consistency to the multiwinner framework. We discuss related literature and compare our
approaches in Section 9.
Our paper is a preliminary attempt to give a formal framework for the study of
preference-based multiwinner rules. Thus we use the word axiom quite freely, without
meaning that it should be a normative requirement. Our work focuses on multiwinner rules
that are based on scoring protocols. Such rules are, in some deep sense, very different
from those that are based on the Condorcet criterion (indeed, in the single-winner case, no
scoring protocol is Condorcet consistent; in effect, a multiwinner rule that degenerates to
the case of a scoring rule for single-member committees cannot be Condorcet consistent in
any natural way). It would be very interesting to apply our framework to Condorcet-based
rules. We leave this as future work.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic terminology used
in this paper; in Section 3 we define the rules that we study and put forward two ways
of classifying them. In Section 4, we define several properties of multiwinner rules and in
Sections 5–8 we study particular groups of these properties in detail. We present related
literature in Section 9 and conclude in Section 10.
2 Preliminaries
An election is a pair E = (C, V ), where C = {c1, . . . , cm} is a set of candidates and
V = (v1, . . . , vn) is a sequence of voters. Each voter is described by a preference order,
which is a ranking of the candidates from the most desirable one to the least desirable one.
We denote the position of a candidate c ∈ C in the preference order of a voter v ∈ V by
posv(c). If V1 and V2 are two sequences of voters over the same candidate set C, then V1+V2
denotes the concatenation of V1 and V2. If V is a sequence of voters and t is an integer,
then tV denotes the concatenation of t copies of V . For E1 = (C, V1) and E2 = (C, V2), we
write E1 +E2 to denote (C, V1 + V2), and for E = (C, V ) and a positive integer t, we write
tE to denote (C, tV ). For an integer n, we denote {1, . . . , n} by [n].
A multiwinner voting rule R is a function that given an election E = (C, V ) and a
positive integer k, k ≤ ‖C‖, returns a set R(E, k) of k-element subsets of C, which we
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call committees. That is, a rule returns a set of committees that are tied-for-winning. In
practice, one would need to combine such a rule with a tie-breaking mechanism but, for
simplicity, we mostly disregard this issue here. Brams and Fishburn [10] introduced choose-k
rules but their definition stipulates that such a rule selects at least k alternatives. Two early
papers that focus on rules selecting committees of size exactly k are those of Debord [19] and
of Felsenthal and Maoz [23]. We use the same approach and when we need to emphasize
the size of the committee, we use the term k-committee selection rules.
Requiring multiwinner rules to pick committees of exactly a given size is natural if, for
example, the goal is to elect a parliament whose size is fixed by the constitution. However,
as a consequence, we are sometimes forced to elect Pareto-dominated candidates (e.g., if
all voters unanimously rank the candidates in the same order and k > 1). Alternatively,
we could require R(E, k) to return committees of up-to-k members. The latter approach is
also studied in the literature (either explicitly or implicitly), but we adopt the former one
due to its simplicity and applicability in our settings of interest.
3 Multiwinner Voting Rules
We now provide definitions of the multiwinner rules that we study and discuss two general
ways of defining them.
3.1 Common Multiwinner Rules
Many multiwinner rules rely on ideas from single-winner rules, so let us review these first.
Many single-winner rules calculate the scores of alternatives to decide which one is best.
Here are some most popular ways of computing candidate scores.
Plurality score. The plurality score of a candidate c is the number of voters that rank c
first.
t-approval score. Let t be a positive integer. The t-approval score of a candidate c is the
number of voters that rank c among the top t positions.
Borda score. Let v be a vote over a candidate set C. The Borda score of a candidate
c ∈ C in v is ‖C‖ − posv(c). The Borda score of c in an election E = (C, V ) is the sum
of c’s Borda scores from all voters in V .
s-score. The tree above types of score are special cases of general scoring protocols. Con-
sider a setting with m candidates and score vector s = (s1, . . . , sm), where s1 ≥ s2 ≥
. . . ≥ sm. We define the s-score of an alternative a in a profile (v1, . . . , vn) as
scs(a) =
n∑
i=1
sposvi (a)
.
It is immediate to see that plurality score is simply the (1, 0, . . . , 0)-score, t-approval
score is the (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
, 0, . . . , 0)-score, and Borda score is the (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0)-score.
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Given these definitions, we are ready to describe the multiwinner rules that we focus
on in this paper. Let E = (C, V ) be an election and let k ∈ [‖C‖] be the size of the
committee that we seek. We assume the parallel-universes tie-breaking [16], i.e., our rules
return all the committees that could result from some breaking of the ties occurring during
the computation of the rule.
Single Transferable Vote (STV). STV is a multistage elimination rule that works as
follows. If there is a candidate c whose Plurality score is at least q =
⌊
‖V ‖
k+1
⌋
+ 1 (the
so-called Droop quota), we do the following: (a) include c in the winning committee,
(b) delete q votes where c is ranked first, and (c) remove c from all the remaining
votes. If each candidate’s Plurality score is less than q, a candidate with the lowest
Plurality score is deleted from all votes. (There are also many other variants of STV;
we point the reader to the work of Tideman and Richardson [48] for details.)
Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV). Under SNTV, we return the k candidates with
the highest Plurality scores (thus one can think of SNTV as simply k-Plurality).
Bloc. Under Bloc, we return the k candidates with the highest k-approval scores.
k-Borda. Under k-Borda, we return the k candidates with the highest Borda scores. De-
bord [18] provided an axiomatic characterization of this rule.
Chamberlin–Courant’s and Monroe’s Rules. These rules explicitly aim at propor-
tional representation. The main idea is to provide an optimal assignment of com-
mittee members to voters by using a satisfaction function to measure the quality of
the assignment.
A satisfaction function is a nonincreasing mapping α : N → N. Intuitively, α(i) is
a voter’s satisfaction from being represented by a candidate that this voter ranks in
position i. We focus on the Borda satisfaction function, which for m candidates is
defined as αmB (i) = m− i.
Let k be the target size of the committee. A function Φ: V → C is called an assign-
ment function and it is called a k-assignment function if ‖Φ(V )‖ ≤ k. Intuitively,
Φ(V ) is the elected committee where voter v is represented by candidate Φ(v). There
are several ways to compute the societal satisfaction from the assignment; we focus
on the following two:
ℓ1(Φ) =
∑
v∈V
α(posv(Φ(v))), ℓmin(Φ) = min
v∈V
(α(posv(Φ(v))),
where α is the given satisfaction function. The former one, ℓ1(Φ), is a utilitarian
measure, which sums the satisfactions of all the voters, and the latter one, ℓmin(Φ), is
an egalitarian measure, which consider the satisfaction of the least satisfied voter.
Let α be a satisfaction function and let ℓ be ℓ1 or ℓmin. Chamberlin–Courant’s rule
with parameters ℓ and α (ℓ-α-CC) finds an assignment function Φ that maximizes ℓ(Φ)
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and declares the candidates in Φ(V ) to be the winning committee. If ‖Φ(V )‖ < k,
the rule fills in the missing committee members in an arbitrary way and outputs
all resulting committees. ℓ-α-Monroe’s rule is defined in the same way, except that
we optimize over assignment functions that additionally satisfy the so-called Monroe
criterion, which requires that ⌊n
k
⌋ ≤ ‖Φ−1(c)‖ ≤ ⌈n
k
⌉ for each elected candidate c.
To simplify notation, we omit αmB when referring to Monroe/CC rule with the Borda
satisfaction function.
For Chamberlin–Courant’s rule, for each set of candidates C ′ ⊆ C we define the
assignment function ΦCC(C ′) so that for each voter v, ΦCC(C ′)(v) is v’s top candidate
in C ′. If W is a winning committee under Chamberlin–Courant’s rule, then ΦCC(W )
is an optimal assignment function.
The utilitarian variants of the rules (i.e., ℓ1-CC and ℓ1-Monroe) were introduced
by Chamberlin and Courant [15] and by Monroe [39], respectively. The egalitarian
variants were introduced by Betzler et al. [7]. Unfortunately, these rules are hard to
compute, irrespective of tie-breaking, both for Borda satisfaction function [7,37] and
for various approval-based satisfaction functions [7,40].
Approximate Variants of ℓ1-Monroe and ℓ1-CC. Hardness results for ℓ1-CC and ℓ1-
Monroe inspired research on designing efficient approximation algorithms for these
rules [37,46]. Here, in the spirit of Caragiannis et al. [13], we consider these algorithms
as full-fledged multiwinner rules.
We refer to the rules based on approximation algorithms for ℓ1-CC and ℓ1-Monroe as
Greedy-CC and Greedy-Monroe, respectively. Greedy-CC was proposed by Lu and
Boutilier [37] and Greedy-Monroe by Skowron et al. [46]. Both rules use the Borda
satisfaction function, aggregated in the utilitarian way, using ℓ1. They proceed in k
iterations, in which they build sets ∅ = W0 ⊂ W1 ⊂ W2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Wk, and declare
Wk to be the winning committee. In the i-th iteration, i ∈ [k], Greedy-CC picks a
candidate ci ∈ C\Wi−1 that maximizes ℓ1(ΦCC(Wi−1∪{ci})), whereWi =Wi−1∪{ci}.
In particular, c1 is an alternative with the highest Borda score.
Greedy-Monroe, in addition to the sets W0, . . . ,Wk, also maintains sets of voters
∅ = V0 ⊂ V1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Vk = V , such that, after the i-th iteration, Vi is the set of
voters for which the rule has already assigned candidates. In the i-th iteration, the
rule picks a number ni ∈ {⌈nk ⌉, ⌊nk ⌋} (see below for the choice criterion) and then
picks a candidate ci ∈ C \ Wi−1 and a group V ′ of ni voters from V \ Vi−1 that
together maximize the Borda score of ci in V
′. The rule sets Wi = Wi−1 ∪ {ci} and
Vi = Vi−1 ∪ V ′ (intuitively, Greedy-Monroe assigns ci to the voters in V ′). Regarding
the choice of ni, if n is of the form kn
′ + n′′, where 0 ≤ n′′ < k, then Greedy-Monroe
picks ⌈n
k
⌉ for the first n′′ iterations and picks ⌊n
k
⌋ for the remaining ones. In particular,
c1 is the Borda winner of a group V1 of n1 voters which maximizes the Borda score
across all subsets of voters of size n1.
Greedy-CC and Greedy-Monroe output committees that approximate those output by
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ℓ1-CC and ℓ1-Monroe. In particular, Greedy-CC finds a committee W such that the
satisfaction of the voters is at least 1− 1
e
of the satisfaction achieved under ℓ1-CC [37],
and Greedy-Monroe finds a committee that achieves at least a 1− k2m−1 − Hkk fraction
of the satisfaction given by ℓ1-Monroe, where Hk =
∑k
i=1
1
k
[46] (for many practical
setting, this value is quite close to 1). These rules are efficiently computable in the
sense that we can output some winning committee in polynomial time; however, their
computational complexity under parallel-universes tie-breaking is not known.
Hardness of Winner Determination. For ℓ1-Monroe and ℓ1-CC, their hardness of
winner determination is known [7,37,40,46]. Other rules that we study, on the surface,
are polynomial-time computable. However, since in this paper we very broadly apply the
parallel-universes tie-breaking, this polynomial-time complexity is not necessarily obvious.
For SNTV, Bloc, and k-Borda, even with this tie-breaking, winner determination is compu-
tationally easy. On the other hand, for STV the problem is NP-hard [16]. For Greedy-CC
and Greedy-Monroe the answer is currently unclear, but for both of these rules there are
simple tie-breaking mechanisms under which they are polynomial-time computable and
which do not break any of the axiomatic properties that we study.
3.2 Two Types of Multiwinner Rules
Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that many of the rules introduced so far have very similar
internal structure. Below we present two natural ways of identifying these similarities.
Best-k Rules. SNTV and k-Borda are natural extensions of Plurality and Borda to the
multiwinner setting: We sort the candidates in the order of decreasing scores (with further
parallel-universes tie-breaking if needed) and pick the top k ones.
We remind the reader that a social preference function F is a function that, given an
election E = (C, V ), returns a set of tied linear orders over C and a social welfare function
returns just one but maybe non-strict linear order. Breaking ties in the latter using the
parallel-universes tie-breaking we can also convert a social welfare function into a social
preference function (in effect, we will often treat social welfare functions as special cases of
social preference functions).
Definition 1. We say that a given multiwinner rule R is a best-k rule if there is a social
preference function F such that for each k ∈ [m], a set W is in R(E, k) if and only if
‖W‖ = k and there is an order ≻ in F (E) such that c ≻ d for each c ∈W and d ∈ C \W .
SNTV and k-Borda are best-k rules. Indeed, a class of best-k rules can be defined by
providing a score vector s = (s1, . . . , sm), where s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm. This defines a social
welfare function which ranks all alternatives in accord with their s-scores, which gives us a
best-k rule. As we will see later, perhaps unexpectedly, Bloc is not a best-k rule.
We can also define a best-k rule based on the social preference function known as the
Kemeny ranking [31], and, somewhat surprisingly, we will later note that Greedy-CC is also
a best-k rule. Thus, best-k rules are a more diverse group than one might at first expect.
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Committee Scoring Rules. Both k-Borda and ℓ1-CC can be viewed as generalizations
of the Borda rule to the multiwinner case. Here we introduce a class of committee scoring
rules, which generalize single-winner scoring rules capturing k-Borda, ℓ1-CC, and many
other rules. We believe that identifying committee scoring rules is an important conceptual
contribution of this paper.
Consider an election E = (C, V ) where we want to pick a committee of size k out
of m = ‖C‖ candidates. A k-winner committee scoring rule is defined via a committee
scoring function f , f : [m]k → N, as follows. Given a committee S and a voter v, we define
posv(S) to be the vector (i1, . . . , ik) resulting from sorting the set {posv(c) | c ∈ S} in the
nondecreasing order. The winning committees are the ones that maximize the sum:
scf (S) =
∑
v∈V
f(posv(S)),
which we call the score of the committee S under f .
Just as for single-winner scoring rules, we require a certain form of monotonicity with
respect to the values of f . Specifically, if I = (i1, . . . , ik) and J = (j1, . . . , jk) are two
increasing sequences of numbers from [m], we say that I  J if and only if (i1 ≤ j1)∧ . . .∧
(ik ≤ jk), and we require that I  J implies f(I) ≥ f(J).
Example 1. Let m be the number of candidates and let k be the target size of the committee.
Define αℓ : [m] → {0, 1} by setting αℓ(i) = 1 if i ≤ ℓ and αℓ(i) = 0 otherwise. For each
i ∈ [m], define β(i) = m− i. SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, and ℓ1-CC are committee scoring rules
defined by:
fSNTV(i1, . . . , ik) = α1(i1),
fBloc(i1, . . . , ik) =
∑k
t=1 αk(it),
fk-Borda(i1, . . . , ik) =
∑k
t=1 β(it),
fCC(i1, . . . , ik) = β(i1).
We note that in the case of fSNTV and fk-Borda, the function f has the form:
f(i1, . . . , ik) = γ(i1) + . . .+ γ(ik), (1)
for some non-increasing function γ not depending on k. This is immediate for fk-Borda and
for fSNTV it follows by the nature of α1. On the other hand, fCC is clearly not of the given
form, and neither is fBloc because function αk depends on k. We refer to committee scoring
functions of the form (1) as separable.
Let us focus on a separable committee scoring rule with a scoring function of the form (1),
and let us denote γ(i) = si, i = 1, . . . ,m. We form a scoring vector s = (s1, . . . sm); since
γ is non-increasing, we have s1 ≥ s2 ≥ · · · ≥ sm and, so, s is indeed a valid scoring vector.
Now, given some committee S = {a1, . . . , ak}, it is easy to verify that the total score of S
at some profile V = (v1, . . . , vn) is:
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
spos(aj ,vi) =
k∑
i=1
scs(ai).
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Hence, the voting rule is the best-k rule induced by the scoring social welfare function
defined by the score vector s. In effect, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Every separable k-committee scoring rule is a k-best rule for some scoring
social welfare function.
According to our definition, Bloc is not a separable committee scoring rule and, in some
ways, it is quite distinct from separable rules (e.g., it is not a best-k rule; we give another
example that Bloc stands out at the end of Section 4). On the other hand, at the formal
level Bloc does look very similar to separable committee scoring rules and it shares a number
of features with them. To capture this fact, we introduce the notion of a weakly separable
committee scoring rule.
Definition 2. We say that a committee scoring rule R, defined through scoring function
f , is weakly separable if there exists a family {αmk | m ∈ N, k ≤ m,αmk : [m] → N} of
nonincreasing functions such that for each m ∈ N, k ≤ m, and sequence 0 < i1 < · · · <
ik ≤ m, we have f(i1, . . . , ik) =
∑k
t=1 α
m
k (it).
The main difference between separable committee scoring rules and weakly separable
ones is that weakly separable ones allow function f to use a score vector that depends on
k (as in the case of Bloc).
Weakly separable committee scoring rules form an interesting class of multiwinner rules.
For example, It is immediate to see that they are polynomial-time computable (provided
that they are defined through a family of polynomial-time computable scoring function)
and in Section 7 we show that they have an interesting monotonicity property.
Proposition 2. If R is a weakly separable committee scoring rule defined through a
polynomial-time computable family of functions (in the sense of Definition 2), then R is
polynomial-time computable.
On the other extreme, we have committee scoring rules defined through functions
f(i1, . . . , ik) whose values depend solely on i1 (like the fourth rule in Example 1). Such
rules seem to focus on voter representation. As in ℓ1-CC, each voter is assigned to her most
preferred candidate in the selected committee, and only contributes towards the score of
this candidate. We call such committee scoring rules representation-focused.
It seems that representation-focused rules, in essence variants of the Chamberlin–
Courant rule, are NP-hard to compute [7,37,40], but there is at least one exception: We
note that SNTV is both separable and representation-focused and, in effect, is polynomial-
time computable. One could say that this is because of its separability. While this indeed
is a convincing explanation, there also are non-separable committee scoring rules that are
polynomial-time computable, with Bloc being perhaps the simplest example (though, Bloc
is weakly separable).
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Committee Solid Consensus Monoto- Homoge- Consis-
Rule Monotonicity Coalitions Committee Unanimity nicity neity tency
STV × √ (⋄) √ (⋄) strong × √(♥) ×
SNTV
√ √ √
weak C/NC
√ √
Bloc × × × fix maj. C/NC √ √
k-Borda
√ × × strong C/NC √ √
ℓ1-CC × × √ weak C √ √
ℓmin-CC × × √ weak C √ ×
Greedy-CC
√ × × weak × √ ×
ℓ1-Monroe × × √ strong × √ (♣) ×
ℓmin-Monroe × × √ strong × √ (♣) ×
Greedy-Monroe × √ √ strong × √ (♠) ×
Table 1: Summary of results.
√
and × indicate that the rule has/does not have the respec-
tive property. C means candidate monotonicity and NC means non-crossing monotonicity
(C/NC means satisfying both conditions). “Fix maj.” in the Unanimity column for Bloc
means that not only Bloc is unanimous in the strong sense, but also that it satisfies the
fixed majority property, which is stronger (none of the other rules satisfy it). The properties
marked with (⋄) hold for STV when n ≥ k(k+1); property marked with (♥) requires STV
to use non-rounded Droop quota and fractional votes. Properties marked with (♣) hold if
n is divisible by k and (♠) in addition requires a specific intermediate tie-breaking rule.
4 Axioms
We now put forward some properties (axioms) that multiwinner rules may or may not
satisfy. We use the standard axioms for single-winner rules as our starting point, and
augment them with ideas from the literature that are specific to the multiwinner domain.
Due to our choice of focus, we do not include properties based on the Condorcet principle,
such as, e.g., the stability of Barbera` and Coelho [4]. We stress that, since multiwinner
rules have a very diverse range of applications, our properties should not necessarily be
understood in the normative way: the desirability of a particular property can only be
evaluated in the context of a specific application. Throughout this section, we write R to
denote some given multiwinner rule.
Our first axiom is nonimposition. It requires that each size-k set of candidates can win.
This is a basic requirement that is trivially satisfied by all rules that we consider.
Nonimposition. For each set of candidates C and each k-element subset W of C, there is
an election E = (C, V ) such that R(E, k) = {W}.
The next three axioms—consistency, homogeneity, and monotonicity—are adapted from
the single-winner setting. For the first two, the adaptation is straightforward.
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Consistency. For every pair of elections E1 = (C, V1), E2 = (C, V2) and each k ∈ [‖C‖], if
R(E1, k) ∩R(E2, k) 6= ∅ then R(E1 +E2, k) = R(E1, k) ∩R(E2, k).
Homogeneity. For each election E = (C, V ), each k ∈ [‖C‖], and each t ∈ N, it holds that
R(tE, k) = R(E, k).
We now consider monotonicity. If c belongs to a winning committee W then, generally
speaking, we cannot expect W to remain winning when c is moved forward in some vote.
For example, this shift may hurt other members of W . Indeed, none of our rules satisfies
this strict version of monotonicity. However, there are two natural relaxations of this
condition. One option is to require that after the shift c belongs to some winning committee.
Alternatively, we may restrict forward movements of c, prohibiting it to overtake other
members ofW . (We point the reader to the work of Sanver and Zwicker [44] for an extensive
discussion of monotonicity in the context of irresolute voting rules.)
Monotonicity. For each election E = (C, V ), each c ∈ C, and each k ∈ [‖C‖], if c ∈ W
for some W ∈ R(E, k), then for each E′ obtained from E by shifting c one position
forward in some vote v it holds that: (1) for candidate monotonicity: c ∈ W ′ for some
W ′ ∈ R(E′, k), and (2) for non-crossing monotonicity: if c was ranked immediately
below some b 6∈W , then W ∈ R(E′, k).
Our next axiom, committee monotonicity, is specific to multiwinner elections, as it deals
with changing the size of the desired committee. Intuitively, it requires that when we
increase the size of the target committee, none of the already selected candidates should be
dropped. Our phrasing is somewhat involved because R returns sets of committees.
Committee Monotonicity. For each election E = (C, V ) the following conditions hold:
(1) For each k ∈ [m− 1], if W ∈ R(E, k) then there exists a W ′ ∈ R(E, k+1) such that
W ⊆W ′; (2) for each k ∈ [m− 1], if W ∈ R(E, k + 1) then there exists a W ′ ∈ R(E, k)
such that W ′ ⊆W .
The second condition in the definition above is aimed to prevent the following situation.
Consider an election E with candidate set C = {a, b, c, . . .}. Without condition (2) a
committee-monotone rule R would be allowed to output the following winning committees:
R(E, 1) = {{a}}, R(E, 2) = {{a, b}, {b, c}}, and so on. Note that the committee {b, c},
which suddenly appears in R(E, 2), breaks what we would intuitively think of as committee
monotonicity, but is not ruled out by condition (1) alone.
Other authors already discussed committee monotonicity in the context of multiwinner
voting, but under different names and usually by arguing that it is paradoxical that a
given voting rule fails committee monotonicity [41,47]. In Section 5 we discuss committee
monotonicity in detail, argue that failing it may be seen as a positive feature of a multiwinner
rule, and use it to axiomatize best-k rules.
The final three axioms represent three implementations of Dummett’s condition known
as proportionality for solid coalitions [20]. Dummett’s original proposal is as follows: Con-
sider an election with n voters where the goal is to pick k candidates. If for some ℓ ∈ [k]
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there is a group of ℓn
k
voters that all rank the same ℓ candidates on top, these ℓ candidates
should be in a winning committee. This requirement, which tries to capture the idea of
proportional representation, seems to be quite strong. We are not aware of a single rule
that satisfies it.2 The following three axioms are weaker and reflect the same idea.
Solid Coalitions. For each election E = (C, V ) and each k ∈ [‖C‖], if at least ‖V ‖
k
voters
rank some candidate c first then c belongs to every committee in R(E, k).
Consensus Committee. For each election E = (C, V ) and each k ∈ [‖C‖], if there is a
k-element set W , W ⊆ C, such that each voter ranks some member of W first and each
member of W is ranked first by either ⌊‖V ‖
k
⌋ or ⌈‖V ‖
k
⌉ voters then R(E, k) = {W}.
Unanimity. For each election E = (C, V ) and each k ∈ [‖C‖], if each voter ranks the
same k candidates W on top (possibly in different order), then R(E, k) = {W} (strong
unanimity) or W ∈ R(E, k) (weak unanimity).
We remind the reader that we list only the axioms that make sense for preference-based
rules which are in some broad sense close to scoring rules. There are however preference-
based axioms that are geared towards Condorcet principle. The following axiom is an
example [19], though it can also be seen as a generalization of the unanimity property.
Fixed Majority. For each election E = (C, V ) and each k ∈ [‖C‖], if there is a k-element
set W , W ⊆ C, such that a strict majority of voters rank all member of W above all
non-members of W , then R(E, k) = {W}.
Almost all the rules that we consider in this paper fail to satisfy this axiom. For most
of them, this already happens in the single-winner setting, with k = 1. Indeed, Plurality
is the only single-winner scoring protocol that guarantees that a candidate ranked on top
by a majority of the voters is the unique winner. However, quite interestingly, Bloc does
satisfy the fixed majority property.3 This is yet another reason to view Bloc as a rule of a
different kind than separable committee scoring rules (even though at the level of formal
definition Bloc is very close to separable rules; see the discussion in Section 3.2).
5 Committee Monotonicity
The desirability of committee monotonicity depends strongly on the application: if we are
choosing finalists of a competition, then it is imperative to use a rule that has this prop-
erty, but in the context of proportional representation requiring that the rule is committee
2There is also a variant of Dummett’s condition known as Droop Proportionality Criterion, which is geared
toward STV [49]; STV can be shown to satisfy Dummett’s condition whenever Droop quota is smaller than
n
k
.
3 To see that this is the case, let W be a committee such that a majority of voters rank all the members
of W on top k positions, and let S be some other committee. It is easy to see that, under Bloc, W has a
higher score than S. Both committees receive the same score for the candidates in W ∩S, but the candidates
in W \ S receive strictly more points than the candidates in S \W .
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monotonic may prevent selecting a truly representative committee. Indeed, this was al-
ready suggested by Black [8]: Consider a society with single-peaked preferences regarding
the left-right political spectrum. If we are picking a single candidate (i.e., if k = 1) then
it is most natural to select as centrist a candidate as possible (formally, we would select a
Condorcet winner). However, if we were to select two candidates to represent the society
(i.e., if k = 2), then selecting a “moderate left-wing” and a “moderate right-wing” can-
didate would, intuitively, give more proportional representation than selecting the centrist
candidate and an additional one (if the additional candidate were to the left of the centrist
one, the right-wing voters would be neglected; if the candidate were to the right of the
centrist one, the left-wing voters would be neglected).
The above intuitions are further strengthened by the fact that committee monotonicity
axiomatically characterizes the class of best-k rules.
Theorem 3. A k-committee selection rule is committee monotonic if and only if this rule
is a best-k rule.
Proof. Let R be a best-k rule and let F be the underlying social preference function.
Consider an election E = (C, V ). Pick k ∈ [‖C‖ − 1] and W ∈ R(E, k). By definition
of a k-best rule, there is an order ≻ in F (E) such that w ≻ c for each w ∈ W and each
c ∈ C \W . Clearly, there is a candidate w′ ∈ C \W such that for each w ∈ W and each
c ∈ C \(W ∪{w′}) we have w ≻ w′ ≻ c. Hence, W ∪{w′} ∈ R(E, k+1). A similar argument
shows that R satisfies the second committee-monotonicity condition.
Conversely, assume that R satisfies committee monotonicity. We will show that it is a
best-k rule by revealing the underlying social preference function F . Let E = (C, V ) be some
election where C = {c1, . . . , cm}. We define F (E) to contain all linear orders ≻ that satisfy
the following condition: If π is a permutation of [m] and cπ(1) ≻ cπ(2) ≻ · · · ≻ cπ(m) then
there is a sequence of sets W1 = {cπ(1)},W2 = {cπ(1), cπ(2)}, . . . ,Wm = {cπ(1), . . . , cπ(m)}
such that W1 ∈ R(E, 1),W2 ∈ R(E, 2), . . . ,Wm ∈ R(E,m). Using the two conditions from
the definition of committee monotonicity, it is easy to verify that F indeed defines R.
Thus SNTV, k-Borda, and all separable committee scoring rules satisfy committee mono-
tonicity. On the other hand, Greedy-CC satisfies committee monotonicity and, in effect, is
a best-k rule as well.
Proposition 4. Greedy-CC satisfies committee monotonicity.
Proof. Given an election E and an integer k, Greedy-CC performs k iterations, in each
picking one member of the committee. However, the member of the committee picked in
each iteration depends only on which members were chosen previously and not on k. Thus,
after Greedy-CC performs k iterations to compute committee of size k, one can simply
perform one more iteration to obtain committee of size k + 1. Conversely, if Greedy-CC is
to compute a committee of size k + 1, it first computes a committee of size k. In effect, it
is clear that Greedy-CC is committee monotone.
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For separable committee scoring rules, by Theorem 1 their underlying social welfare
functions are the scoring ones. This possibly distinguishes them from rules such as Greedy-
CC, whose underlying social preference functions may not be based on scoring rules.
Proposition 5. STV, Bloc, ℓ1-CC, ℓmin-CC, ℓ1-Monroe, ℓmin-Monroe, and Greedy-Monroe
do not satisfy committee monotonicity.
Proof. Let us first consider ℓ1-CC, ℓmin-CC, ℓ1-Monroe, ℓmin-Monroe, and Greedy-Monroe.
Let E = (C, V ) be an election with C = {a, b, c, d} and the following four votes:
v1 : a ≻ c ≻ b ≻ d, v2 : b ≻ c ≻ a ≻ d,
v3 : a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b, v4 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a.
It is easy to see that for k = 1 the unique winning committee is {c} but for k = 2 the unique
winning committee is {a, b}.
The case of Bloc was resolved by Staring [47], but we include a simple argument for the
sake of completeness. We use election E = (C, V ) with C = {a, b, c} and four votes:
v1 : a ≻ b ≻ c, v2 : b ≻ c ≻ a,
v3 : a ≻ c ≻ b, v4 : c ≻ b ≻ a.
For k = 1 Bloc has unique winning committee {a}, but with k = 2 the unique winning
committee is {b, c}.
Our example for STV is a bit more involved. Consider E = (C, V ) with C = {a, b, c, d}
and with 24 voters. We have:
(1) 11 voters with preference order a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d,
(2) 3 voters with preference order b ≻ c ≻ a ≻ d,
(3) 4 voters with preference order c ≻ d ≻ a ≻ b, and
(4) 6 voters with preference order d ≻ c ≻ a ≻ b.
For k = 1, the Droop quota is ⌊242 ⌋ + 1 = 13. In the first round no candidate meets the
quota and so STV eliminates the candidate with the lowest plurality score, that is, b. In
the next round still no candidate meets the quota and STV eliminates d. In the resulting
profile c has plurality score 13 and is the unique winner for k = 1.
For k = 2, the Droop quota is ⌊243 ⌋ + 1 = 9. Thus in the first round STV picks a and
removes it from the election together with 9 voters that rank it first. The remaining two
voters that supported a transfer their votes to b, who now has plurality score 5. Thus in
the next round no candidate meets the quota and STV eliminates c. In the next round d
has plurality score 10 and is selected. The unique winning committee is {a, d}.
Corollary 6. STV, Bloc, ℓ1-CC, ℓmin-CC, ℓ1-Monroe, ℓmin-Monroe, and Greedy-Monroe
are not best-k rules.
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6 Dummett’s Proportionality
Properties in the spirit of Dummett’s proportionality condition (with the exception of una-
nimity) are geared toward rules that aim to achieve proportional representation of the
voters. Thus, in this section, we judge multiwinner rules from this perspective.
We start by considering the solid coalitions property. It is easy to see that it is satisfied
by both SNTV and STV.
Theorem 7. SNTV has the solid coalitions property. STV also has it for each election with
n ≥ k(k + 1), where n is the number of voters and k is the size of the winning committee.
Proof. For SNTV it suffices to note that if there are n voters and some candidate c is ranked
first by n
k
voters, then—by a simple counting argument—there cannot be k other candidates
each of whom is ranked first by at least n
k
voters. Thus c must be included in each winning
committee.
For STV, the Droop quota has value ⌊ n
k+1⌋ + 1 and, if n ≥ k(k + 1), then it is smaller
or equal to n
k
. Thus if there is a candidate c who is ranked first by n
k
candidates then this
candidate will be included in the winning committee.
On the other hand, even though this property seems to be very much in spirit of the
Monroe and Chamberlin–Courant rules, ℓ1-Monroe, ℓ1-CC, ℓmin-Monroe, and ℓmin-CC fail
to satisfy it. Yet, it is satisfied by Greedy-Monroe.
Theorem 8. ℓ1-CC, ℓmin-CC, ℓ1-Monroe, and ℓmin-Monroe do not have the solid coalitions
property, but Greedy-Monroe does have it.
Proof. Let us consider an election with candidate set C = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g} and nine voters
whose preference orders are
v1 : a ≻ e ≻ d ≻ f ≻ g ≻ b ≻ c,
v2 : b ≻ f ≻ d ≻ e ≻ g ≻ a ≻ c,
v3 : c ≻ g ≻ d ≻ e ≻ f ≻ a ≻ b,
v4 : a ≻ e ≻ d ≻ f ≻ g ≻ b ≻ c,
v5 : b ≻ f ≻ d ≻ e ≻ g ≻ a ≻ c,
v6 : c ≻ g ≻ d ≻ e ≻ f ≻ a ≻ b,
v7 : d ≻ a ≻ e ≻ f ≻ g ≻ b ≻ c,
v8 : d ≻ b ≻ e ≻ f ≻ g ≻ a ≻ c,
v9 : d ≻ c ≻ e ≻ f ≻ g ≻ a ≻ b.
It can be easily verified that none of the four versions of the Chamberlin-Courant and
Monroe rules elect a committee of size 3 that contains d, even though this would be required
by the solid coalitions property. Indeed, for the committee {a, b, c} the total satisfaction
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is 9‖C‖ − 12 in the utilitarian version and ‖C‖ − 1 in the egalitarian one. However if d is
on the committee, then at most two of the candidates among a, b, c, e, f, g are also in the
committee and so the total satisfaction is, respectively, at most 9‖C‖ − 13 and ‖C‖ − 2.
For the second part of the theorem, we consider Greedy-Monroe. Take some election
with n voters, where we seek a committee of size k. Suppose that some candidate c is
ranked first by at least n
k
voters. Greedy-Monroe starts by picking candidates ranked first
by at least n
k
voters. By the time it considers c, each of the voters that rank c first remains
unassigned, so it picks c.
We believe that the solid coalitions property is desirable, but not crucial for applications
that require proportional representation (e.g., parliamentary elections). In contrast, the
consensus committee property, which we discuss next, seems to be fundamental. Indeed, it
is satisfied by almost all rules that aim to achieve proportional representation.
When k is a divisor of n, the consensus committee property is satisfied by every rule
that has the solid coalitions property. In particular, it is satisfied by SNTV, STV (if there
are sufficiently many voters) and Greedy-Monroe. It is also satisfied by ℓ1-CC, ℓmin-CC,
ℓ1-Monroe, and ℓmin-Monroe, but, interestingly, not by Greedy-CC. This reveals a major
deficiency of the latter rule: It makes decisions regarding the inclusion of some candidate c
into the committee based on the preferences of the voters to whom c would not be assigned.
This is very problematic for a rule that seeks to approximate ℓ1-CC; interestingly, the feature
of Greedy-CC that causes this is also responsible for the rule being committee monotone.
Proposition 9. Bloc, k-Borda and Greedy-CC do not have the consensus committee prop-
erty (nor the solid coalitions property).
Proof. Consider an election with C = {a, b, c, d} and two voters with preference orders
b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a and a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b. We seek a committee of size k = 2. Then the consensus
committee is {a, b} but each of these rules includes c in each winning committee and thus
fails the consensus committee property.
For SNTV, ℓ1-CC, k-Borda and Bloc, the above results can also be seen as incarnations
of the following two more general results regarding committee scoring rules.
Proposition 10. Let R be a separable committee scoring rule, let k < m, and let
f(i1, . . . , ik) =
∑k
t=1 γ(t) be the respective committee scoring function. Then R fails the
consensus committee property if 0 < γ(1) ≤ kγ(2), but satisfies it if γ(1) > kγ(2) and there
are sufficiently many voters.
Proof. We first consider the case when 0 < γ(1) ≤ kγ(2). Consider an election E = (C, V )
with m candidates and k+1 voters. Let c1, . . . , ck, x be some k+1 candidates from C. We
form the preference orders of the voters so that each ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, is ranked first by
exactly one voter, ck is ranked first by two voters, the voters that do not rank c1 first rank
c1 last, and each voter ranks x second. Aside from that, the preference orders are arbitrary.
If R had the consensus committee property, then {c1, . . . , ck} would be the unique winning
committee. Since R by Theorem 1 is a best-k rule for scoring vector s = (s1, . . . , sm), with
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m = ‖C‖, where si = γ(i), it suffices to show that c1 gets lower score than x with respect
to s. Indeed, the score of x is (k + 1)s2 and the score of c1 is s1. Since we assume that
0 < γ(1) ≤ kγ(2), we have s1 ≤ ks2. Moreover, since each c2, . . . , ck has s-score equal or
higher than c1, we have that {c1, . . . , ck} is not a winning committee. Thus R does not
have the consensus committee property.
Suppose now that γ(1) > kγ(2). Consider an arbitrary election E = (C, V ), where there
is a group W of k candidates such that each voter ranks some member of W first and each
member of W is ranked first by either ⌊n
k
⌋ or ⌈n
k
⌉ voters. Consider a candidate x /∈ W .
Its s-score (where s is defined as in the previous paragraph) is at most ns2. On the other
hand, the score of each candidate in W is at least ⌊n
k
⌋s1. By assumption, ⌊nk ⌋s1 > ns2 for
sufficiently large n and, thus, R satisfies the consensus committee property for such n.
Proposition 11. Let R be a representation-focused k-committee scoring rule with commit-
tee scoring function f(i1, . . . , ik) = β(i1). Then R has the consensus committee property if
and only if γ(1) > γ(2).
Proof. Consider an election E that satisfies the conditions of the consensus committee
property. If γ(1) > γ(2) then clearly the k candidates from E that are ranked first form a
unique winning committee. On the other hand, if γ(1) = γ(2) then it is possible to form an
election with more than one winning committee. It suffices to consider a profile of k votes
over 2k candidates, where each vote ranks a distinct pair of candidates on top. In this case,
there are at least 2k different winning committees.
Our final instantiation of Dummett’s proportionality for solid coalitions is the unanimity
property. Every committee scoring rule satisfies its weak variant.
Theorem 12. Every committee scoring rule R satisfies weak unanimity.
Proof. Consider an election E = (C, V ) where every voters ranks candidates from some set
W , ‖W‖ = k, on top. Let f be the committee scoring function for R. By definition, for
each voter v in V and each size-k set Q of candidates, we have f(posv(W )) ≥ f(posv(Q)).
Thus, we have W ∈ R(E, k).
It is immediate that ℓ1-Monroe, ℓmin-Monroe, Greedy-Monroe, Bloc and k-Borda satisfy
strong unanimity, and that SNTV, ℓ1-CC, ℓmin-CC, and Greedy-CC do not (to see this,
consider an election where all the voters have the same preference order; by definition, in
those cases these rules choose all the committees that include the candidate ranked first by
all the voters).
Finally, we note that STV satisfies strong unanimity. If there is some set W of k
candidates that each of the n voters ranks on top, then in every round of STV there is a
candidate from W that is ranked first by at least ⌊ n
k+1⌋+ 1 voters.
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7 Monotonicity
Being monotonic is a natural and easily satisfiable condition for single-winner rules. Among
the few examples of prominent non-monotonic single-winner rules are STV and Dodgson’s
rule [12]. In contrast, for multiwinner rules monotonicity is a rather demanding property.
However, all committee scoring rules satisfy candidate monotonicity, and all separable com-
mittee scoring rules satisfy non-crossing monotonicity.
Theorem 13. Let R be a k-committee scoring rule. Then R satisfies candidate monotonic-
ity.
Proof. Consider an election E = (C, V ) with ‖C‖ = m. Let f be the k-committee scoring
function defining R for m candidates and k winners. Let W be a committee in R(E, k) and
let c be a candidate in W . Consider a vote v ∈ V that does not rank c first, and replace
it with a vote v′ obtained from v by shifting c one position forward. Denote the resulting
election by E′.
By construction, we have f(posv′(W )) ≥ f(posv(W )). On the other hand, for each
committee S ⊆ C \ {c}, we have f(posv′(S)) ≤ f(posv(S)). Since W was a winning
committee for E, this means that either W is also a winning committee for E′ or some
committee W ′ ∈ R(E′, k) has a higher score. We must have c ∈W ′, since only committees
with c can have a higher score in E′, compared to E.
Theorem 14. Let R be a weakly separable k-committee scoring rule. Then R satisfies
non-crossing monotonicity.
Proof. Let E = (C, V ) be an election with m candidates. Let f be a weakly separable
committee scoring function defining R. Let W be a winning committee and let c ∈ W .
Consider a vote v where c is not directly preceded by a member of W . Let d be the
candidate who is directly above c in v (d /∈ W ) and let v′ be a vote obtained from v by
swapping c and d.
After the swap, committees that include c and not d gain the same number f(posv′(W ))−
f(posv(W )) of points and this number is non-negative; every committee with both c and d
(or with neither c nor d) maintains the same score, and every committee with d but not c
loses f(posv′(W ))− f(posv(W )) ≥ 0 points. Thus W ∈ R(E′, k).
To complete the discussion of committee scoring rules, we need to consider non-separable
committee scoring rules with respect to the non-crossing monotonicity. It appears that these
rules (such as ℓ1-CC) do not normally satisfy the non-crossing monotonicity.
Proposition 15. ℓ1-CC, ℓ1-Monroe, Greedy-CC, and Greedy-Monroe fail non-crossing
monotonicity.
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Proof. Consider election E = (C, V ) where C = {a, b, c, d, x1, . . . , x6} and V = (v1, . . . , v6).
The preference orders of the voters are as follows:
v1 : a ≻ x1 ≻ c ≻ b ≻ · · · , v2 : a ≻ x2 ≻ d ≻ b ≻ · · · ,
v3 : b ≻ x3 ≻ a ≻ c ≻ · · · , v4 : b ≻ x4 ≻ d ≻ c ≻ · · · ,
v5 : c ≻ x5 ≻ a ≻ b ≻ · · · , v6 : c ≻ x6 ≻ d ≻ b ≻ · · · .
The reader can quickly verify that if we seek a committee of size k = 2 then, according
to ℓ1-CC, there are three winning committees, {a, b}, {a, c}, and {b, c}, each with satis-
faction 6‖C‖ − 11. If we focus on committee {a, c}, non-crossing monotonicity requires
this committee to still be winning after shifting c forward by one position in v1. However,
if that happens, the satisfaction of {a, c} does not change but the satisfaction of {b, c}
increases to 6‖C‖ − 10. The same construction works for ℓ1-Monroe, Greedy-CC, and
Greedy-Monroe.
While ℓmin-CC is not a committee scoring rule, it behaves similarly to non-separable
committee scoring rules. However, this is not the case for ℓmin-Monroe.
Theorem 16. ℓmin-CC satisfies candidate monotonicity, but ℓmin-Monroe fails it. Both
ℓmin-CC and ℓmin-Monroe fail non-crossing monotonicity.
Proof. The proof of the first part is similar to that of Theorem 13. If W is a winning
committee for ℓmin-CC and c is a candidate in W , then shifting c forward has the following
effect. The aggregate satisfaction of every committee that includes c either increases by one,
or stays the same. The aggregate satisfaction of every committee not containing c either
stays the same or decreases by one. Thus c belongs to at least one winning committee. To
show that ℓmin-Monroe fails candidate monotonicity, consider an election with candidate set
C = {a, b, c, d} and four voters V = (v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6), with preference orders as follows:
v1 : a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b, v2 : c ≻ a ≻ d ≻ b,
v3 : b ≻ d ≻ c ≻ a, v4 : d ≻ b ≻ a ≻ c, (2)
v5 : d ≻ a ≻ c ≻ b, v6 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a.
For k = 2, the winning committees are {a, b} and {c, d}, both with satisfaction ‖C‖ − 2. If
we shift a forward by one position in v4, the satisfaction of {a, b} decreases to ‖C‖ − 3 but
the satisfaction of {c, d} stays the same.
To see that ℓmin-CC fails non-crossing monotonicity, consider election E = (C, V ) with
C = {a, b, c, x1, . . . , x11} and V = (v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6), where the voters have the following
preference orders:
v1 : a ≻ x1 ≻ x2 ≻ b ≻ · · · , v2 : x3 ≻ x4 ≻ x5 ≻ c ≻ · · · ,
v3 : b ≻ a ≻ c ≻ x6 ≻ · · · , v4 : b ≻ a ≻ c ≻ x7 ≻ · · · ,
v5 : b ≻ c ≻ x8 ≻ x9 ≻ · · · , v6 : a ≻ c ≻ x10 ≻ x11 ≻ · · · .
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We seek a committee of size k = 2. There are four tied ones, {b, c} and {a, c}, {x1, c}
and {x2, c}, all with aggregate satisfaction ‖C‖ − 4. These are the winners. Non-crossing
monotonicity requires that if we shift c forward in v2, then {b, c} should still be a winning
committee. However, this committee’s satisfaction stays the same, whereas the satisfaction
of {a, c} increases to ‖C‖ − 3. The same construction applies to ℓmin-Monroe.
The remaining multiwinner rules studied in this paper fail each of our monotonicity
criteria. For STV this is well-known to happen even for k = 1. For the rest of the rules, we
provide the following result.
Proposition 17. ℓ1-Monroe, Greedy-Monroe, and Greedy-CC fail candidate monotonicity.
Proof. First, we note that the argument given in Theorem 16 to show that ℓmin-Monroe is
not candidate monotone (profile (2) and moving a forward in vote v4) in fact also applies
to ℓ1-Monroe.
We move on to Greedy-Monroe. Let E = (C, V ) be an election with C = {a, b, c, d} and
V = (v1, . . . , v8) whose preference orders are:
v1 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a ≻ e, v2 : d ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a ≻ e,
v3 : a ≻ e ≻ d ≻ b ≻ c, v4 : a ≻ b ≻ d ≻ c ≻ e,
v5 : a ≻ e ≻ d ≻ b ≻ c, v6 : b ≻ d ≻ a ≻ c ≻ e,
v7 : d ≻ c ≻ b ≻ a ≻ e, v8 : c ≻ b ≻ d ≻ a ≻ e.
For k = 2, under Greedy-Monroe there are two winning committees {a, c} and {b, d}. This
is so because in the first iteration, Greedy-Monroe picks either a or b. If it picks a, then in
the next iteration it picks c. If it picks b, then irrespective which voters it chooses to assign
to b in the first iteration (among the assignments allowed under Greedy-Monroe), in the
second iteration it picks d. However, if we shift c forward by one position in v6 then only
{b, d} remains winning (Greedy-Monroe no longer can pick a in the first iteration). This
shows that Greedy-Monroe is not candidate monotone.
For the case of Greedy-CC, consider the election E = (C, V ) with C = {a, b, c, d} and
V = (v1, . . . , v6), where
v1 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d, v2 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a,
v3 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d, v4 : c ≻ b ≻ d ≻ a,
v5 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d, v6 : d ≻ a ≻ c ≻ b.
For k = 2, Greedy-CC declares {a, b} and {a, c} as winners. (In the first iteration Greedy-
CC picks either a or b. In the former case, in the second iteration it picks either b or c.
In the latter case, i.e., if it picks b in the first iteration, in the second iteration it picks c).
However, if we shift c forward by one position in v6, then {a, b} and {a, d} are winning (in
this case, in the first iteration Greedy-CC has to pick b, and then in the second iteration
there is a tie between a and d). Thus Greedy-CC fails candidate monotonicity as well.
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8 Consistency and Homogeneity
For single-winner rules, the famous Young’s theorem [50] says that only scoring rules and
their compositions satisfy consistency. While we do not know how to extend this result to
multiwinner rules, the situation seems to be similar: We show that every committee scoring
rule satisfies consistency, whereas other rules fail it.
Proposition 18. Every committee scoring rule satisfies consistency. In particular, ℓ1-CC
is consistent.
Proof. Let R be a k-committee selection scoring rule and let f be the corresponding com-
mittee scoring function. Let E1 and E2 be two elections, E1 = (C, V1) and E2 = (C, V2),
where ‖C‖ = m, and where R(E1, k) ∩R(E2, k) 6= ∅.
Let W be a committee such that W ∈ R(E1, k) and W ∈ R(E2, k). We claim that
W ∈ R(E1 + E2). If it were not the case, then there would have to be a committee Q of
size k such that either the score of Q in E1 or the score of Q in E2 were higher than that
of W in these elections. This contradicts the choice of W .
Similarly, if T is a winning committee for E1 + E2 then it must be the case that T ∈
R(E1, k) and T ∈ R(E2, k). This is so, because the score of T in E1+E2 is the same as that
of W . However, if T were not in R(E1, k), then this would mean that the score of T in E1
is smaller than the score of W in E1 and, so, the score of T in E2 is higher than that of W
in E2. This would mean that it is not the case that W ∈ R(E1, k) and W ∈ R(E2, k).
Now let us turn our attention to the negative results. We note that some of our rules,
such as STV, ℓmin-CC and ℓmin-Monroe, can be ruled out to be consistent on the basis of
Young’s result because for k = 1 these rules are not scoring rules.
Corollary 19. Neither of STV, ℓmin-CC and ℓmin-Monroe is consistent.
On the other hand, for k = 1 each of ℓ1-Monroe, Greedy-CC and Greedy-Monroe is
equivalent to Borda, which is consistent. For these rules, we directly show that they are
not consistent.
Proposition 20. Neither of ℓ1-Monroe, Greedy-CC and Greedy-Monroe is consistent.
Proof. Consider ℓ1-Monroe. Let E1 = (C, V1) and E2 = (C, V2) be two elections, where
C = {a, b, c, d, e}, V1 = (v1, v2, v3, v4) and V2 = (v5, v6, v7, v8). The voters in V1 have the
following preferences:
v1 : a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e ≻ b, v2 : a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e ≻ b,
v3 : a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e ≻ b, v4 : b ≻ e ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a.
The voters in V2 have the following preferences:
v5 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e, v6 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e,
v7 : c ≻ d ≻ b ≻ e ≻ a, v8 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e ≻ a.
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We seek a committee of size k = 2. It is straightforward to check that under ℓ1-Monroe,
committee {a, c} would win in both E1 and E2 but in E1+E2, committee {a, b} has higher
satisfaction than {a, c}.
For Greedy-Monroe, we use C = {a, b, c, d} and elections E1 = (C, V1) and E2 = (C, V2),
where V1 and V2 have two voters each. The voters in V1 have the following preferences:
v1 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d, v2 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d.
The voters in V2 have the following preference orders:
v3 : a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b, v4 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a.
For k = 2, Greedy-Monroe chooses {a, b} as the winning committee in both elections, but
for E1 + E2 it chooses {a, b} and {a, c} (due to the parallel-universe tie-breaking). This
shows that Greedy-Monroe is not consistent.
For Greedy-CC we, again, take C = {a, b, c, d} and elections E1 = (C, V1) and E2 =
(C, V2) but this time V1 and V2 contain four voters each. The voters in V1 have the following
preference orders:
v1 : a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b, v2 : a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b,
v3 : a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b, v4 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a.
The voters in V2 have the following preference orders:
v5 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a, v6 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a,
v7 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a, v8 : a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b.
For k = 2, in both E1 and E2, Greedy-CC picks {a, b}. However, in E1 +E2 it picks {a, c}
and {b, c} (to see that Greedy-CC is non consistent it suffices to note that in E1+E2 it has
to pick c in the first iteration because c is the unique Borda winner in this election).
We now consider homogeneity. Naturally, committee scoring rules are homogeneous
because consistency implies homogeneity. For other rules, the situation is more complex.
Theorem 21. Both ℓmin-CC and Greedy-CC satisfy homogeneity.
We omit these proofs since they are straightforward. Interestingly, neither of the variants
of Monroe’s rule is homogeneous, although, as we will see in Theorem 23, ℓ1-Monroe, ℓmin-
Monroe are partially homogeneous.
Proposition 22. ℓ1-Monroe, ℓmin-Monroe, and Greedy-Monroe are not homogeneous.
Proof. Consider an election with candidate set C = {a, b, c, d} and three voters v1, v2, and
v3, with the following preference orders:
v1 : a ≻ b ≻ d ≻ c, v2 : a ≻ b ≻ d ≻ c, v3 : c ≻ b ≻ d ≻ a.
We seek a committee of size k = 2. For ℓ1-Monroe, Greedy-Monroe and ℓmin-Monroe, the
unique winning committee of size 2 is {a, c}. However, for 2E the winner sets for these
rules include {a, b}.
22
On the positive side, if the number of voters is divisible by the size of the committee,
then ℓ1-Monroe and ℓmin-Monroe are homogeneous. In essence, this means that variants of
Monroe fail homogeneity due to rounding problems in the Monroe criterion. One solution
would be to clone each voter k times when seeking a committee of size k. We do not
consider this modification of Monroe’s rule here, but it would be interesting to see how the
satisfaction of a committee elected in this way compares to that elected without cloning.
Theorem 23. Both ℓ1-Monroe and ℓmin-Monroe satisfy homogeneity, provided that the
number of voters n in the election is divisible by the size k of the committee to be selected.
Proof. Let R ∈ {ℓ1-Monroe, ℓmin-Monroe}, pick an election E = (C, V ), and let k be a
positive integer that divides n = ‖V ‖. We will show that R(E, k) = R(tE, k) for each
t > 0.
Let W be a committee that wins in tE. We refer to the members of W as the winners.
Let Φ: tV → C be an assignment of candidates to voters witnessing that W ∈ R(tE, k). By
Monroe’s criterion, for each w ∈ W we have ‖Φ−1(w)‖ = nt
k
. We now proceed as follows.
First, we show how to transform Φ into an assignment Φ′ such that (a) under Φ′ each winner
represents exactly n
k
voters in each copy of V and (b) the satisfaction of the voters under
Φ′ is the same as under Φ. We then prove that Φ′ can be further transformed into Φ′′ that
uses the same assignment for each copy of V .
Let V1, . . . , Vt be t copies of V so that tV = V1+ · · ·+Vt; we assume that within each Vi,
i ∈ [t], voters are listed in the same order. For each i ∈ [t], ℓ ∈ [n], we write vi,ℓ to denote
the ℓ-th voter in Vi. Our proof relies on the observation that for each ℓ ∈ [n] and each
i, j ∈ [t], if we take some assignment function Φ and swap its values for vi,ℓ and vj,ℓ, then
we get an assignment function Φ′ with the same societal satisfaction. To exploit this fact,
for each ℓ ∈ [n], we write rep(ℓ) = {Φ(vi,ℓ) | i ∈ [t]} to denote the set of the representatives
(under Φ) of the set of ℓ’th voters in the profiles V1, V2, . . . , Vt.
We now show that, using the transformations just described, it is possible to transform
Φ into an assignment Φ(1) which assigns each winner from W to exactly n
k
voters from V1.
We use the fact that for each ℓ ∈ [n], we can assign an arbitrary member of rep(ℓ) to voter
v1,ℓ by swapping the representative of v1,ℓ with the representative of vj,ℓ, for appropriately
selected j. We build the following bipartite graph (the vertices are partitioned into the set
of voter vertices and the set of winner vertices):
1. The voter vertices are exactly the voters from V1.
2. For each winner w ∈ W , we have n
k
winner vertices w1, . . . , w
n
k which we will call
clones of w.
3. For each voter vertex v1,ℓ ∈ V1 and each winner w ∈W , there are edges between v1,ℓ
and each of the winner vertices w1, . . . , w
n
k , if w ∈ rep(ℓ), and no such edges exist, if
w /∈ rep(ℓ).
It is clear that if there is a perfect matching between the voter vertices and the winner
vertices in this graph, then it is possible to transform Φ into Φ(1) that assigns each winner
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to exactly n
k
voters in V1. Given such a perfect matching, we transform Φ so that for each
voter v1,ℓ that is matched to some vertex w
u, we swap this voter’s representative (if it is
not already w) with the representative of some voter vj,ℓ for whom Φ(vj,ℓ) = w. This is
possible since w ∈ rep(ℓ). Thus it remains to show that our graph has a perfect matching.
To this end, we use the famous Hall’s theorem.
For each subset V ′ of voter vertices, we define the set of neighbors of V ′, denoted
N(V ′), to be the set of those winner vertices that are connected to some member of V ′.
Hall’s theorem says that there is a perfect matching in our graph if and only if for every set
V ′ of voter vertices we have ‖N(V ′)‖ ≥ ‖V ′‖.
Let V ′ be some arbitrary subset of voter vertices. By the construction of our graph, we
know that if N(V ′) contains one clone of w, then it contains all of them, hence ‖N(V ′)‖
is of the form q n
k
, where q is a positive integer, and that N(V ′) corresponds to a set of
q winners, each of whom has n
k
clones in N(V ′). This means that in tV there is a group
of t‖V ′‖ voters represented under Φ by q winners. Since in tV each winner is assigned to
exactly tn
k
voters, it must be that t‖V ′‖ ≤ qtn
k
. This is equivalent to ‖V ′‖ ≤ q n
k
= ‖N(V ′)‖,
the requirement of the Hall’s theorem. Thus there is a perfect matching for our graph and
the desired assignment Φ(1) exists.
Now, removing V1 from consideration and repeating the above procedure for V2, then V3,
and so on, we can eventually transform Φ(1) into Φ′, where each winner represents exactly
n
k
voters from each sequence of voters Vi, i ∈ [t]. It is then easy to see that we can replace
Φ′ with Φ′′ that uses the same assignment of winners to voters within each copy of Vi (each
Vi has an assignment with the same societal satisfaction; otherwise the original assignment
Φ would not have been optimal). This implies that W ∈ R(E, k) because otherwise there
would be some set W ′ ∈ R(E, k) that would give lower satisfaction to the voters in tE than
W gives. Analogously, this means that every W ′ ∈ R(E, k) also belongs to R(tE, k).
Proposition 24. Greedy-Monroe fails homogeneity even if the size of the committee divides
the number of voters.
Proof. Let E = (C, V ) be an election with C = {a, b, c, d} and V = {v1, . . . , v6}. The voters
have the following preference orders:
v1 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d, v2 : b ≻ a ≻ d ≻ c, v3 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d,
v4 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a, v5 : c ≻ a ≻ d ≻ b, v6 : d ≻ a ≻ c ≻ b.
We seek a committee of size k = 2. Under Greedy-Monroe, the tied-for-winning committees
are {a, b} and {a, c}. Indeed, in the first iteration Greedy-Monroe may pick a. It can assign
a to (v1, v2, v3), (v1, v3, v5), or (v1, v3, v6). Depending on the choice, in the second iteration
it picks either c or b. In the first iteration it can also pick b, then in the second iteration it
picks a.
Now consider election 2E. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}, j ∈ {1, 2} we write vji to refer to vi
in the j-th copy of E. In the first iteration, Greedy-Monroe again is allowed to pick a (due
to parallel-universes tie-breaking). By parallel-universes tie-breaking, it is allowed to assign
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a to v11 , v
2
1 , v
1
2 , v
1
3 , v
2
3 , v
1
5 . Thus, in the second iteration, the remaining votes are:
v16 : d ≻ a ≻ c ≻ b, v22 : b ≻ a ≻ d ≻ c, v25 : c ≻ a ≻ d ≻ b,
v14 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a, v24 : b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ a, v26 : d ≻ a ≻ c ≻ b.
The unique Borda winner of this election is d, so Greedy-Monroe picks d in the second
iteration. This means that {a, d} is a winning committee in 2E, a contradiction.
The above proposition relies heavily on parallel-universes tie-breaking. It is possible
to refine the intermediate tie-breaking procedure of Greedy-Monroe so that it becomes
homogeneous when k divides ‖V ‖. We omit the details here.
9 Related Literature
With all the preceding discussions in hand, it is high time to discuss how our results and
approaches compare to others in the literature. Unfortunately, the literature on the proper-
ties of multiwinner rules is still relatively sparse, compared to that regarding single-winner
rules, and is scattered between different fields of research, ranging from behavioral science,
through political science, social choice theory, to computer science. Here we review those
papers that are in spirit closest to our work.
The paper most closely related to ours is that of Felsenthal and Maoz [23]. They
consider four k-choice functions, the Plurality rule (i.e., in our terminology, the SNTV
rule), the Approval rule,4 the Borda rule (i.e., k-Borda), and STV. They adapt a range
of single-winner normative properties to the multiwinner setting and study them in the
context of these rules. The main two differences between our paper and theirs are as
follows. First, we study a somewhat different set of rules (in particular we do not consider
the Approval rule, but we do consider Bloc and a number of rules focused on proportional
representation). Second, the set of axioms that we consider is closer in spirit to the goal of
achieving proportional representation than theirs. On the one hand, we introduce some new
axioms that try to capture proportional representation (such as consensus committee and
solid coalitions properties), and, on the other hand, we do not consider axioms related to the
Condorcet principle (and Felsenthal and Maoz do). Naturally, our papers also have many
similarities. Both we and Felsenthal and Maoz consider monotonicity, though our view
is slightly more detailed (we study two variants, candidate monotonicity and non-crossing
monotonicity). Both us and Felsenthal and Maoz [23] study committee monotonicity, which
they call continuity. We prefer our name since continuity in social choice refers to a different
property [50]. Finally, both Felsenthal and Maoz and us study the consistency property,
which is crucial when one considers rules based on scoring protocols (indeed, as shown by
Young [50], up to some tie-breaking specifics, scoring protocols are the only single-winner
rules that are consistent, and, thus, it is natural to expect that a similar result holds in the
4This rule is not preference-based
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multiwinner setting; very interestingly, consistency also plays an important role in Bock et
al.’s study of consensus-based multiwinner rules [9]).
Young’s consistency-based characterization of scoring rules, as well as his characteriza-
tion of the Borda rule, have already inspired researchers working on multiwinner rules. For
example, Debord extended Young’s characterization of Borda to the case of k-Borda, by
showing that it is the rule that satisfies the axioms of neutrality, faithfulness, consistency,
and the cancellation property (we point readers to his work for details on these proper-
ties [18]). In his follow-up work, Debord also introduced some new axioms for multiwinner
rules. These axioms, however, are geared toward the case of rules that elect what he calls
k-elites [19], which are multiwinner analogs of Condorcet winners. Indeed, there is a number
of multiwinner rules that focus on electing a committee by following the principle of Con-
dorcet consistency; related issues were considered, for example, by Barbera` and Coelho [4],
Kaymak and Sanver [30] Fishburn [26], Ratliff [41], and others. Since we do not consider
Condorcet rules, we do not present this literature in depth.
The study of committee selection rules in approval voting framework is well-advanced.
Kilgour [32] describes a number of approval-based voting rules that elect a committee of
fixed size and proved some of their basic properties, Kilgour and Marshall [33] give a nice
survey of approval-based committee selection rules and add some new ones. Aziz et al [2]
have recently introduced an axiom called Justified Representation and showed that in their
framework the only committee selection rule that satisfies it is Proportional Approval Voting
(PAV). Again, we do not focus on approval-based rules so we point the readers to the above-
cited papers for more detailed discussions.
Multiwinner voting often raises controversies. For example, Staring [47] demonstrates
that Bloc rule is extremely committee non-monotonic (he calls it increasing-committee-size
paradox). He demonstrates a profile where the winning committee of size three is disjoint
from the winning committee of size two, and the winning committee of size four is disjoint
from those for sizes two and three. Similar phenomena is observed by Ratliff [41] for other
rules, who even titled his paper “Some Startling Inconsistencies when Electing Committees”
(we mention that, in another paper, he also points to some possibly undesirable behavior
in other multiwinner settings [42]). On the other hand, in this paper we view the fact
that a rule fails to be committee monotonic as a rather expected feature of every rule that
attempts to achieve proportional representation of the voters. This is yet another reason
to believe that multiwinner rules can only be judged in the context of their applications. A
rule for selecting a parliament should satisfy quite different desiderata than a rule used for
shortlisting.
Multiwinner voting rules are more complex than the single-winner ones also from the
computational standpoint. While there are some computationally hard single-winner rules
(most notably the rules of Kemeny, Young, and Dodgson [5,6,28,29,43]), for the case of
multiwinner voting, this problem seems to be much more pronounced. For example, Dar-
mann [17] showed that testing if a given committee satisfies a particular Condorcet crite-
rion is NP-hard. Similarly, it is NP-hard to compute winners under Monroe’s rule [7,40],
Chamberlin–Courant’s rule [7,37,40], and many other similar rules [45]. The same holds
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for a number of approval-based rules such as PAV [3,45] or Minimax Approval rule [36] of
Brams et al. [11], or even for STV with parallel-universes tie-breaking [16]. In effect, many
researchers have sought efficient approximate algorithms for these rules, many of which can
be viewed as full-fledged voting rules in their own right. Indeed, this is how the Greedy-
CC [37] and Greedy-Monroe [46] rules that we study came to be. Nonetheless, there is also a
number of natural multiwinner rules that are polynomial-time computable. These include,
for example, rules based on electing candidates with the k highest scores according to some
scoring protocol (e.g., SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda), but also some other, more complicated rules
(see, e.g., the work of Klamler et al. [34]).
10 Conclusions
We formalized a number of natural properties for multiwinner voting rules and conducted a
comprehensive comparison of ten prominent multiwinner rules with respect to these prop-
erties. The choice of these rules was guided by the fact that each of them, in some broad
sense, is based on some single-winner scoring rule. In the course of our study, we identified
two natural families of multiwinner rules, best-k rules and committee scoring rules. The
latter class is particularly interesting because it contains both rules of low complexity, such
as k-Borda, SNTV, and Bloc, and rules with hard winner-determination problems, such as
ℓ1-CC. We have put forward a framework for studying multiwinner rules and considered
a number of their properties. We believe that our results give a better understanding of
applicability of various multiwinner rules to particular tasks. For example, we see that
best-k rules are well-suited for picking a group of finalists in a competition, whereas rules
based on the Monroe criterion (ℓ1-Monroe, ℓmin-Monroe, and Greedy-Monroe), as well as
STV, seem to be more appropriate for applications that require proportional representation
(e.g., parliamentary elections). In this context, Greedy-Monroe is particularly interesting.
It was derived as an approximation algorithm for ℓ1-Monroe [46], but it has more appealing
properties than the original rule. We believe that Greedy-Monroe should be taken as a
full-fledged voting rule.
Our results for ℓ1-CC and ℓmin-CC are similar to those for Monroe, but intuitively these
rules are better suited for applications such as movie selection (see the introduction) than,
say, parliamentary elections. The reason is that they may assign very different numbers
of voters to each winning candidate (naturally, one could imagine rules for parliamentary
elections where voters would be represented by more than a single person—and thus different
winning candidates might represent different numbers of voters—but ℓ1-CC and ℓmin-CC do
not operate on such basis). Thus, if ℓ1-CC or ℓmin-CC were used to elect a parliament, this
parliament would have to use weighted voting in its operation. A recommendation system,
on the other hand, simply needs to present users with a “committee” of items so that as
many customers (voters) as possible would find at least one of them satisfying.
In this light, it is a bit disappointing that Greedy-CC, which was designed as an approx-
imation algorithm for ℓ1-CC, does not seem to perform very well in our comparison. Indeed,
it fails to satisfy the solid coalitions property (like ℓ1-CC but unlike Greedy-Monroe) and
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it fails to satisfy the consensus committee property (unlike every other rule that focuses on
some form of proportional representation). This latter fact can be seen as a consequence
of Greedy-CC satisfying committee monotonicity (which we argued to be undesirable from
the point of view of proportional representation).
After comparing Greedy-CC and Greedy-Monroe, it is tempting to simply use Greedy-
Monroe in Greedy-CC’s place. However, perhaps a better idea would be to modify Greedy-
Monroe to not respect the Monroe’s criterion. Then the challenge would be to optimally
pick the numbers of voters that Greedy-Monroe considers in each iteration. We believe that
studying such variant of Greedy-Monroe is an important research direction.
Finally, our results regarding SNTV are quite interesting. It turns out that, among all
the rules that we consider, SNTV satisfies all the properties that we defined (though it only
satisfies unanimity in the weak sense). One explanation for this fact is that it can be viewed
as an approximation of the rule that simply picks all the candidates that are ranked first
by at least one voter, and, in this sense, is close to implementing direct democracy. Yet
one should not forget that SNTV ignores each voter’s preferences beyond the top candidate
and, thus, inherits all negative features of the Plurality rule.
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